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Abstract 
We explored group and organizational safety norms as antecedents to meeting leader behaviors 
and achievement of desired outcomes in a special after-action review case—a post-fall huddle. A 
longitudinal survey design was used to investigate the relationship between organizational/group 
safety norms, huddle leader behavior, and huddle meeting effectiveness.  The sample included 
healthcare workers in critical access hospitals (N = 206) who completed a baseline safety norm 
assessment and an assessment of post-fall huddle experiences ree to six months later. Findings 
indicate that organizational and group safety norms relate to perceived huddle meeting 
effectiveness through appropriate huddle leader behavior in a partial mediated framework. In 
contrast to previous research showing after-action reviews predicting group and organizational 
safety norms, the longitudinal study presented here suggests that group and organizational safety 
norms set the stage for the enactment of post-fall huddles in an effective manner. 
 
Keywords: Post-Fall Huddles, After Action Reviews, Safety Norms, Leadership  
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Group and Organizational Safety Norms Set the Stage for Good Post-Fall Huddles 
Efforts to improve organizational safety and quality are of upmost concern. Industrial 
accidents cause nearly 427,000 non-fatal employee illnesses and 5,300 worker fatalities in the 
United States each year, with an estimated total economic impact of $198.2 billion (National 
Safety Council, 2014). Organizational safety concerns also affect consumers. In healthcare 
settings, nearly one in 10 patients experience a healthcare acquired condition (Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, 2014), and as many as 440,000 patient deaths may be 
attributed to preventable medical errors every year (James, 2013). Preventable medical errors 
cost upwards of $19.5 billion, and estimates of the economic impact of poor healthcare quality 
and medical errors may exceed $98 billion (Andel, Davidow, Hollander, & Moreno, 2012). 
Thus, organizational leaders - especially in healthcare organizations - seek ways to reduce costs 
associated with accidents of all types and improve safety and well-being of employees and 
clients/patients (Chassin & Loeb, 2011; Zohar, 2000). One way to improve safety in 
organizations is the development and maintenance of a safety climate and group norms for safe 
behavior (Dunn, Scott, Allen, & Bonilla, 2016; Zohar, 2000). 
Organizations with a strong climate for safety often have fewer accidents and injuries 
(Zohar, 2000) and lower incidences of patient safety events (Singer, Lin, Falwell, Gaba, & 
Baker, 2009). Safety climate is a type of group and organizational climate in which employees 
believe that management rewards, supports, and expects safe behavior and safe work practices 
(Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996, 1998). Thus, when organizations and groups have strong, positive 
safety climates, employees tend to engage in more safety behaviors and also avoid engaging in 
risky behaviors (Zohar, 2000). These changes in behavior result in reduced costs associated with 
accidents or deaths from poor behavior in risky environments. Therefore, one goal of 
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practitioners and researchers is to determine those organizational and group processes that 
increase the frequency of safe behaviors; one such process is the use of after-action reviews 
(Tannenbaum & Cerasoli, 2013). 
Interventions like after-action reviews (AARs) may be implemented within an 
organization to facilitate sensemaking and learning to prevent future errors, and such activities 
foster a culture and climate of safety (Allen, Baran, & Scott, 2010). AARs are a specific type of 
workgroup meeting in which people discuss, interpret, and attempt to make sense of a recent 
event during which they collaborated (Scott, Allen, Bonilla, Baran, & Murphy, 2013). AARs are 
also referred to as post-incident critiques, post mortems, hot washes, huddles, or debriefs. AARs 
are a common process in organizations that operate in high risk contexts because they help to 
maintain reliability and resiliency by facilitating learning in groups/teams from past events and 
changing perceptions and shared understanding of risky behaviors (Busby, 1999). 
Much of the past research on the relationship between leadership and organizational and 
team culture and climate focuses on the role of the leader in shaping the climate. The purpose of 
this study was to take a different approach to previous models of establishing a good safety 
climate and group safety norms (e.g. how a given intervention promotes safety norms; Baran, 
Allen, & Scott, 2010) (see Figure 1). Specifically, our research here considered how established 
group and organizational safety norms within an organization related to individual leader 
behaviors in AARs and the outcomes of AARs used to learn from events (see Figure 2). Using 
Schein’s (2010) model of culture and leadership, we assert that safety norms will promote leader 
engagement in effective AAR leader behaviors resulting in more effective AARs. Schein argues 
that leaders both promote organizational culture and are also shaped by the existing culture. 
Specifically, lower level leaders (such as those that tend to lead AARs) are selected to reflect and 
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represent the current organizational and group culture. When an organization or group focuses on 
safety culture, leader effectiveness will be determined in part by the leader’s alignment of their 
behavior with the safety culture (Schein, 2010). We further suggest that group safety norms will 
facilitate leader behaviors that enable learning from the AAR. That is, leader behaviors that focus 
on learning from errors or near errors, avoiding blame, showing respect and encouraging 
different points of view will then facilitate effective communication, information exchange and 
learning in AARs and improve learning. These in turn will result in increased satisfaction and 
perceptions of effectiveness by participants in the AAR. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 and 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Group and Organizational Safety Norms and Leadership 
 Norms represent the shared way in which individuals understand and behave within a 
particular setting (Cialdini & Trost, 1998), and reflect the culture of the organization (Schein, 
2010). In the context of safety, safety norms reflect individuals’ understanding of safety and how 
to behave safely within their group and organization, respectively (Allen et al., 2010). Norms, 
such as safety norms, are learned and develop through interactions and communication with 
others, help individuals identify safety concerns, and guide decisions about how one responds to 
the situation (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Furthermore, senior management and leadership may set 
expectations that guide the development of organizational safety norms through the introduction 
of organizational policies and procedures needed to attain organizational strategies and goals 
related to safety (Zohar, 2000). Similarly, supervisors and managers institute practices necessary 
to implement and execute organizational policies and procedures relevant to safety at various 
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subunits of the organization, which may guide the development of group safety norms (Zohar, 
2000).  
Organizations seek to promote group and organizational safety climate and norms as they 
relate to actual safety outcomes (e.g., accidents) among employees in organizations (Clarke, 
2006). What is less known is whether safety norms relate to process-oriented behaviors that 
enact and regulate such norms within the organizations such as leader behavior and AARs. That 
is, what processes regulate the behaviors of employees such that accidents are less likely beyond 
the feeling and desire to maintain alliance with the organizational and group norms? As norms 
reflect the culture of the group and the organization, we expect that safety norms would have an 
effect on leader behavior. That is, group and organizational norms can determine how leaders 
attend to information and how leaders behave. Further, leaders then transmit organizational and 
group culture through a variety of mechanisms (Schein, 2010). Schein (2010) identifies six 
primary ways in which leaders transmit the organizational culture. These six mechanisms include 
(1) what leaders pay attention to; (2) how leaders react to crisis and critical incidents; (3) how 
leaders allocate resources; (4) role modeling and teaching; (5) allocation of rewards; and (6) how 
leaders recruit and select. In addition, Shivers-Blackwell (2006) found that perceptions of 
organizational culture influence how leaders perceive their own role and behaviors within the 
organization. AARs can be considered as a situation in which a critical incident is being 
discussed, and the leader of the AAR acts as a role model for how to learn from errors, allowing 
leaders to engage in two of these mechanisms. Further, leader behavior within the AAR is likely 
influenced by leader perception of organizational safety climate. 
AARs, Safety, and the Post-Fall Huddle 
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 An AAR is a post-event meeting intended to facilitate conversation about an incident or 
near incident to identify what happened and why, help team members analyze how their actions 
contributed to the outcome, and identify necessary changes (Ellis, Mendel, & Nir, 2006). 
Previous work shows that AARs were related to safety climate and the development of safety 
norms depending upon the quality of the AARs (Dunn et al., 2016) as well as the extent to which 
they occur on a regular basis (Allen et al., 2010). Much of this research looks at typical military 
or paramilitary organizations such as firefighter crews, however, the usefulness of AARs may be 
broader than these studies suggest. 
Conducting AARs is particularly important in healthcare settings, where a focus on 
learning and planning to prevent similar future events or near misses is a beneficial response to a 
particular adverse event (Nicolini, Waring, & Megnis, 2011). A post-fall huddle is a special case 
of AAR that occurs immediately after a patient fall, and a best practice in a comprehensive fall 
risk reduction program (Boushon et al., 2012; Degelau et al., 2012). Post-fall huddles may 
include a variety of healthcare professionals (e.g., nurses, physical therapists, pharmacists) in 
addition to family members and the patient. Recent research indicates healthcare professionals 
may readily adopt post-fall huddles to learn from and prevent future patient falls, and that the use 
of post-fall huddles over time may reduce certain types of errors that contribute to these patient 
safety events (Reiter-Palmon, Kennel, Allen, Jones, & Skinner, 2015).  
Group and Organizational Safety Norms and Post-Fall Huddle Effectiveness 
More frequent use of AARs to discuss and learn from events improves perceptions of 
group safety norms (Allen et al., 2010; Dunn et al., 2016). However, strong group and 
organizational safety norms may also provide an environment and context that supports the 
enactment of AARs and huddles in an effective way. That is, instead of AARs promoting safety 
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norms, we argue that if an organization has good group and organizational safety norms, then 
AARs are enacted more effectively. Specifically, safety norms may encourage individuals to 
engage in actions and activities that ultimately promote safety. One mechanism by which safety 
norms can encourage more effective participation is through leader behaviors in these AARs. 
Specifically, organizational culture and its related norms, in this case, safety norms, will provide 
the leader with guidelines as to what behavior is considered appropriate in the context of the 
AAR (Schein, 2010; Shivers-Blackwell, 2006), such as how to react to critical incidents and role 
model appropriate behavior in such situations. As such, strong safety norms would indicate not 
only that AARs are necessary, but also what specific leader behaviors are conducive in 
facilitating learning (Schein, 2010). Post-fall huddles are uniquely situated to test this idea, as the 
individuals who convene to participate in a huddle may vary depending upon time of day, shift, 
location of the fall, and availability of individuals from various health care disciplines beyond 
nursing (Reiter-Palmon et al., 2015). Due to the variation in personnel that attend post-fall 
huddles, we expected that organizational and group safety norms will exert even a stronger 
influence on leader behavior in post-fall huddles. 
Specifically, we believe that positive organizational and group safety norms enable 
leaders to more effectively enact the post-fall huddle and thereby improve the effectiveness of 
these small group meetings.  Meeting effectiveness is the extent to which a meeting 
accomplishes the goals for which it was called (Rogelberg, Leach, Warr, & Burnfield, 2006).  
Sometimes these goals can be objectively measured, for example, in the case where the meeting 
includes an identifiable task and outcome.  However, both anecdotal experience and research 
indicate that meetings are often poorly run and do not accomplish the goal for which they are 
called, if such a goal even existed (Allen, Lehmann-Willenbrock, & Rogelberg, 2015).  As such, 
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more recently, meeting effectiveness is indexed by asking participants how effective they feel the 
meeting was based on overall experience (Cohen, Rogelberg, Allen, and Luong, 2011).  This 
more global approach has been used in a variety of studies connecting meeting effectiveness and 
satisfaction to a variety of workplace attitudes and outcomes (e.g. Rogelberg, Allen, Shanock, 
Scott, & Shuffler, 2010; Lehmann-Willenbrock, Allen, & Belyeu, 2016). 
In regard to post-fall huddles, effective after-action reviews focus on sensemaking, 
learning from errors, and the development of a plan to address safety concerns to prevent another 
patient fall (Reiter-Palmon et al., 2015). If group and organizational norms prioritize and 
emphasize safety, participation in activities such as post-fall huddles may become a standard 
practice and naturally be supported by these cultural norms. Operating with an understanding 
that safety is critical to the attainment of group and organizational goals, individuals participating 
in post-fall huddles may engage in effective discussion and reflection, knowing that learning 
from and preventing future patient falls are desired safety outcomes for the group and the 
organization. Thus, we expected that group and organizational safety norms will positively relate 
to post-fall huddle effectiveness. 
Hypothesis 1: Group safety norms and organizational safety norms are positively related 
to post-fall huddle effectiveness. 
Meeting Leader Behaviors and Post-Fall Huddle Effectiveness 
As indicated earlier, a post-fall huddle is a specific form of an AAR meeting. More recent 
research on meetings has explored the role and function of a facilitator or leader to promote 
effective meetings (Malouff, Calic, McGrory, Murrell, & Schutte, 2012; Ravn, 2013). Ravn 
(2013) proposed that meeting leaders can engage in activities such as setting direction and focus, 
monitoring conversation, and encouraging participation, in an effort to enhance the meaning and 
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value derived from the meeting. Credo, Armenakis, Feild and Young (2010) found that when 
employees perceive positive relationships with their supervisor, safety norms and safety 
knowledge were higher. Similarly, Borgersen, Hystad, Larsson, and Eid (2014) found a moderate 
relationship between leadership behaviors and safety climate in the shipping industry. Keinmann, 
Nussbaumer, Rosenbaum, Olien, and Rogelberg (2016) found that meeting satisfaction was 
greater when leaders were viewed as engaging in more considerate behaviors such as 
encouraging participation, listening, facilitating exchange of information, and ensuing learning 
from past events. Therefore, we suggest that a constellation of leader behaviors focusing on 
support of employees, engaging in open and safe discussion of errors and near misses in a 
positive way, and emphasizing learning will lead to more effective AARs.  
These  leader behaviors are particularly important to post-fall huddle effectiveness, as 
there is rarely a set or consistent facilitator who leads any given post-fall huddle given variations 
in the time of day, shift, and location of the fall (Reiter-Palmon et al., 2015). Leaders may create 
conditions that support effective and constructive huddles by exhibiting and visibly modeling 
appropriate and desired behaviors, such as open reflection, sharing information, and respectful 
interaction (Provost, Lanham, Leykum, Mc Daniel Jr., & Pugh, 2015). Thus, we expected that 
effective post-fall huddle leader behaviors will improve the effectiveness of these huddles.  
Hypothesis 2: Huddle leader behaviors in post-fall huddles are positively related to 
overall huddle effectiveness. 
Mediated Model of Safety Norms, Huddle Leader Behaviors, and Effective Huddles 
Given the importance of meeting leader behaviors on effectiveness and outcomes of 
meetings, organizational and group norms may improve huddle effectiveness through its effects 
on huddle leader behaviors. Although cultural expectations and norms within groups and 
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organizations may be supported by managers and leaders, culture and norms may also indicate to 
and constrain leadership actions that are expected within the group and organization (Alvesson, 
2011; Shivers-Blackwell, 2006). As indicated by Schein (2010), leader behavior often reflects 
organizational culture and norms. Leader behaviors are not only a mechanism that transmits 
culture and norms, leader behaviors are also shaped by the organizational culture and reflect it. 
When group and organizational standards indicate safety is necessary to attain group and 
organizational goals, post-fall huddle leaders are likely to be motivated to encourage open 
discussion and reflection and role model behaviors necessary to learn from and prevent future 
patient falls, therefore facilitating the transmission of these important norms. Post fall huddles 
are a particularly effective approach as these take place after an error or adverse event (a fall). 
This allows the post fall huddle leader to reinforce safety norms by engaging employees in a 
discussion around how the event could have been prevented and how future events can be 
prevented. Thus, consistent with previous work on culture and its transmission, we expected 
group and organizational safety norms will create an environment that condones huddle leader 
behaviors that focus on learning and modeling of support and respect, and that such behaviors 
would in turn improve huddle effectiveness (see Figure 2). 
Hypothesis 3a: Huddle leader behaviors mediate the positive relationship between group 
safety norms and huddle effectiveness. 
Hypothesis 3b: Huddle leader behaviors mediate the positive relationship between 
organizational safety norms and huddle effectiveness. 
Method 
Sample and procedure 
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 Hospital staff from 15 small rural critical access hospitals (CAHs) in a Midwestern state 
participated in a two-year project funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ) to decrease fall risk. CAHs are a special category of hospital created in 1997 by the 
U.S. government to maintain access to care in rural areas by providing cost based reimbursement 
for services provided to Medicare beneficiaries. CAHs are licensed for 25 or fewer beds, have an 
annual average length of stay less than 4 days, and are at least 35 miles from the next hospital 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2013). CAHs may benefit from interventions 
to improve fall risk reduction practices because they have higher inpatient fall rates than larger 
hospitals (Jones et al., 2015), lack external financial regulatory incentives to reduce falls (Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services), and have limited resources to implement quality 
improvement activities (Flex Monitoring Team, 2004).  
In February and March 2014, 2,550 hospital staff who provided direct patient care, those 
whose work directly affected patient care, providers, and those who identified as administration 
and management were invited to complete an online survey about the hospital’s safety culture. 
Approximately 1,701 staff members among the 15 hospitals completed this survey, with an 
average hospital response rate of 67% (range 40-81%).  
Approximately three to six months later (i.e., June through August 2014), 1,550 hospital 
staff who provided direct patient care, provided services in patient rooms, were members of the 
hospital fall risk reduction team, or were part of management were invited to complete a survey 
about their experiences with post-fall huddles. Consistent with evidence-based practice, hospitals 
in the fall risk reduction project were expected to implement post-fall huddles after each patient 
fall, regardless of whether harm occurred (Degelau et al., 2012). These staff were instructed that 
the purpose of the huddles was three-fold: (1) to identify the factors that contributed to that 
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specific patient fall (i.e. the root causes), (2) to identify interventions to reduce the risk of a 
future fall, and (3) to apply what is learned in a huddle to other patients, thus improving the 
reliability of the system. Participants were asked to complete the post-fall huddle questions if 
they had participated in at least one post-fall huddle during the two year falls project. 
Approximately 245 staff members (15.8%) among those surveyed in the 15 hospitals indicated 
they had participated in at least one post-fall huddle (M = 3.83, SD = 3.03) and completed the 
survey. Falls are typically an infrequent adverse event (Mahoney, 1998), thus, there were a 
relatively small number of patient falls reported among the project hospitals (N = 328, M = 22 
per hospital, range 6-50). Approximately 65% of falls were followed by a huddle (n = 213, M = 
14 per hospital, range 4-33), and personnel who may participate in a post-fall huddle vary based 
on time of day and patient.  
Each participant was assigned a unique identifier that was linked to their name and 
hospital to match survey respondents across the two surveys that occurred three to six months 
apart. In total, 206 staff members among the 15 hospitals completed both the safety culture and 
post-fall huddle surveys. Most respondents were middle-aged (M = 44.20, SD = 12.61), 
Caucasian (90.8%), and female (85.4%). Nearly two-thirds (63.6%) were registered nurses, 
licensed practical nurses, nurse practitioners, or certified nursing assistants; the remainder were 
physical and occupational therapy and assistants (9.7%); management (8.3%); pharmacy and 
assistants (2.4%); quality improvement, risk management, and patient safety (2.4%); physician 
assistants (0.5%); and other ancillary hospital staff (12.6%).    
Measures 
 Organizational and group safety norms. Participants completed two domains of the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) Hospital Survey on Patient Safety 
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Culture (HSOPS): management support for patient safety (i.e., organizational safety norms; three 
items; sample item, “Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient 
safety”), and supervisor and manager actions promoting patient safety (i.e., group safety norms; 
four items; sample item, “My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for 
improving patient safety”). Although norms are considered a shared belief, we focus on 
individual level perceptions of the norms which is consistent with previous work on safety norms 
in organizations (Allen et al., 2010). Items in these two domains are the items used in Zohar and 
Luria’s (2005) organization safety climate measure, and Zohar’s (2000) group safety climate 
measure. Participants responded to each survey item on a 1-5 Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly 
Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree).  
 Huddle leader behaviors. Approximately 178 (73%) respondents indicated their huddle 
had a formal or informal leader and were asked to complete eight items from the huddle leader 
behaviors survey (Dunn et al., 2016) to evaluate their perceptions of post-fall huddle leader 
behaviors from their most recent huddle (sample item, “During the huddle, the leader allowed 
everyone involved in the huddle a chance to speak”). Participants responded to each survey item 
on a 1-5 Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree).  
 Huddle effectiveness. Post-fall huddle survey participants indicated the effectiveness of 
their most recent huddle with three items from the huddle effectiveness survey (Cohen, 
Rogelberg, Allen, & Luong, 2011). Participants indicated the extent to which their most recent 
huddle was efficient, productive, and effective, on a 1-5 Likert-type scale (1 = To no extent, 5 = 
To a great extent).  
 Demographic control variables. A variety of potential demographic control variables 
were assessed including age, gender, and race; none demonstrated a significant correlation with 
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the study variables. Consistent with current conventions concerning the use of control variables 
(Becker, 2005), we did not include them in the subsequent analyses. 
Results 
 Table 1 displays variable means, standard deviations, correlations, and Cronbach alpha 
reliabilities. All measures demonstrated acceptable reliabilities. Correlations among all variables 
were significant and consistent with the direction of the hypotheses. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Hypothesis Tests 
 Multiple regression was used to test Hypothesis 1, which indicated group safety norms 
and organizational safety norms would be positively related to post-fall huddle effectiveness 
rated approximately three months later. Consistent with this hypothesis, group safety norms (β = 
.27, p < .001), and organizational safety norms (β = .24, p = .002), were both significantly and 
positively related to post-fall huddle effectiveness and explained a significant amount of variance 
(R2 = .21). Hypothesis 2 stated huddle leader behaviors in post-fall huddles would be positively 
related to overall huddle effectiveness. Consistent with this hypothesis, huddle leader behaviors 
(β = .60, p < .001) were significantly and positively related to huddle effectiveness. 
 We followed Hayes’ (2009) recommendations to test the mediation hypotheses, and 
Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping methods to evaluate the indirect effects of group and 
organizational safety norms (independent variables) on huddle effectiveness (outcome) through 
huddle leader behaviors (mediator). Hypothesis 3a indicated huddle leader behaviors would 
mediate the positive relationship between group safety norms and huddle effectiveness (see 
Table 2). Results indicate a partial mediation, such that the positive effect of group safety norms 
on huddle effectiveness is partially mediated by huddle leader behaviors. Hypothesis 3b stated 
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huddle leader behaviors would mediate the positive relationship between organizational safety 
norms and huddle effectiveness (see Table 3). Results also indicate a partial mediation, such that 
the positive effect of organizational safety norms on huddle effectiveness is partially mediated by 
huddle leader behaviors. Using 5,000 bootstrap samples, we computed indirect effect estimates 
and 95% confidence intervals for these estimates. Table 4 displays the results of the 
bootstrapping analyses. The indirect effects of both organizational safety norms and group safety 
norms on huddle effectiveness by huddle leader behaviors were significant. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2, 3, and 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Discussion 
The impact of organizational and group safety norms on AAR effectiveness was partially 
mediated by huddle leader behaviors. This suggests that individuals in organizations with 
environments supporting strong group and organization safety norms may be primed to initiate 
safety improvement processes, such as AARs, and do so effectively.  That is, positive safety 
norms may set the stage for subsequent behaviors that are rewarded, supported, and expected by 
the organizational or group safety climate (Hobfoll, 1989; Zohar, 2000). Those that lack such 
norms may require more extensive actions, incentives, and effort to reframe individuals’ attitudes 
and understanding around the benefits of safety for themselves and others in order to improve 
effectiveness of safety actions and learning experiences.  Specifically, one reason why safety 
initiatives may not immediately work is because the prevailing safety climate/culture does not 
support the behavior and therefore, more robust efforts may be needed to reframe attitudes 
towards safety generally. 
Theoretical Implications  
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 Several theoretical implications follow from the current study. First, this study suggests a 
possible feedback loop in the relationship between AARs and group safety norms. Previous 
research indicates AARs may improve norms (Allen et al., 2010; Dunn et al., 2016), and our 
results further suggest that safety norms may improve perceptions of AARs. That is, more 
frequent and effective use of AARs can improve individuals’ perceptions of safety norms, which 
may, in turn, improve their use and perceptions of AAR effectiveness. Furthermore, this study  
supports the importance of leader behaviors in conducting effective meetings (Malouff et al., 
2012; Ravn, 2013; Seibold & Krikorian, 1997) such as AARs. Our research indicates that strong 
group and organizational safety norms may be an important antecedent to effective AAR 
leadership, and that engagement in effective leadership behaviors in AARs may explain part of 
the effect of safety norms on perceptions of effective AAR meetings such as post-fall huddles. 
This finding is particularly important as effective post-fall huddles facilitate sensemaking, 
learning from errors, and the development of a plan to address safety concerns to prevent another 
patient fall (Reiter-Palmon et al., 2015). 
 Second, this study confirms that AARs may be a useful tool in a variety of contexts.  The 
majority of research on AARs or debriefs has occurred in military, paramilitary, and other high 
risk occupations (Tannenbaum & Cerasoli, 2013). The nature of risks in healthcare domains is 
not the same as military contexts, yet the complexity of the situations, the consequences of 
mistakes, and the need for high levels of expertise make healthcare an appropriate context to 
deploy a learning tool such as AARs, particularly at an identifiable problem such as patient falls 
(Reiter-Palmon et al., 2015).  
 Third, demonstrating that effective AAR leader behaviors increase as the positive safety 
norms increase has implications for leadership research and theory. Specifically, this study adds 
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more to the ongoing discussion of how organizational culture, and specifically norms, shape 
leader behaviors and facilitate what behaviors are viewed as effective (Schein, 2010). Based on 
this study, the desired behaviors in AARs emerge as a function of a work environment that 
promotes such behavior, thereby supporting leadership emergence through their behavior. Future 
research should investigate individual differences in those who do and do not respond favorably 
to the positive safety norm environment identified here. This study adds to the limited empirical 
testing of this notion. 
Practical Implications  
 The importance of leader behaviors in conducting effective meetings (Malouff et al., 
2012; Ravn, 2013; Seibold & Krikorian, 1997) is well-established. Efforts to develop and train 
leaders to demonstrate specific behaviors related to leading effective meetings, including AARs, 
are certainly necessary. Knowing that post-fall huddle leaders respond favorably to strong 
positive safety norms suggests another mechanism to encourage effective leader behavior in 
AARs is to improve organizational and group safety climate. Thus, a practical application of 
these results suggest organizational leaders and managers should identify ways to improve the 
safety climate/norms of their organizations at both the organizational and the group levels. Such 
efforts may start with senior leadership and group level management to establish and enforce 
expectations, policies, and procedures (Zohar, 2000) prior to initiating safety protocol 
interventions. Evaluation of safety climate and tracking changes in safety climate over time may 
be fruitful.  
Targeted efforts to improve safety climate/culture may also provide opportunities for 
promoting a variety of safety behaviors, including AARs (i.e. huddles). In this case, these efforts 
are particularly important given the retrospective nature of post-fall huddles. These types of 
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AARs occur post-event (e.g., after a patient fall) to facilitate sensemaking, learning from errors, 
and the development of plans and commitment to actions to prevent a similar event from 
occurring in the future (Reiter-Palmon et al., 2015). If safety climate/culture can encourage 
effective leader actions in such meetings, organizations confronted with safety concerns may 
embrace the benefits of a climate of safety on proactive actions to prevent safety events from 
occurring at all. By extension, if leaders respond favorably to one type of organizational 
environmental factor, it stands to reason that other climate factors may have similar effects on 
leader behavior and employee enactment of such norms (Schein, 2010).   
Limitations 
 The limitations of this study must be taken into account when considering the study 
results and their respective implications and generalizations to theory and practice. The small 
sample size of hospitals and large variation in survey response (specific to post-fall huddles and 
matched responses with the safety assessment) within hospitals limited our ability to control for 
hospital effects and nesting of data. As indicated in the method section, inpatient falls are 
typically an infrequent adverse event (Mahoney, 1998), explaining the large variation in number 
of falls, the subsequent number of post-fall huddles across hospitals, and the number of 
respondents who completed all of the study assessments. However, the pattern of results were 
consistent across hospitals, independent of hospital size.  
All study variables were measured with perceptual, self-report surveys,  suggesting a 
susceptibility to method variance and common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003). We took steps to attempt to minimize the impact of method bias in our results, 
following recommendations established in the literature (Conway & Lance, 2010; Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). In particular, given the limited frequency and relative 
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unpredictability of inpatient falls, and respect for patient and staff privacy in the process of care, 
the feasibility of using other methods, such as direct or videotaped observation, to evaluate the 
study variables in question was limited. Further, the study participants worked within the 
organizational and group safety norms, were exposed to the effects of the huddle leader 
behaviors, and formed perceptions of the effectiveness of the huddle. Thus, consistent with the 
intentions of our research questions, we used perceptual survey measures to evaluate individuals’ 
perceptions of group and organizational climate, huddle leader behaviors, and huddle 
effectiveness. The study design and methodology evaluated safety norms independent of, and 
just prior to, the evaluation of huddle effectiveness and leader behaviors, creating a temporal 
separation in measurement of the key predictors and criterion. Finally, the survey used in the 
evaluation of safety norms is a widely used measure of hospital safety culture with strong 
psychometric properties (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2016).  
Finally, the unique nature of our sample (small, rural critical access hospitals) may bound 
the generalizability of our findings as it is unclear whether such “small scale” initiatives can have 
an equally meaningful impact on a large system hospital. Replications and extensions of this 
work are necessary to further support the stability and generalizability of the study findings. 
Future research can explore these effects in larger systems, and within other high-reliability 
industries seeking approaches to improve effectiveness of AARs and other structured reflection 
and learning opportunities.  
Future Directions  
 The forgoing study turned the typical model of promoting safety in organizations on its 
head, to some extent.  Instead of simply trying to promote safety norms through a variety of 
means, this study argued that having a positive safety climate/norms made the enactment of a 
SAFETY NORMS AND POST-FALL HUDDLES  21 
 
subsequent safety initiative more effective.  The opportunities for future research, given the 
findings here, are quite exciting. For example, a variety of other safety initiatives such as 
rewards, incentives, adoption of safety equipment, and so forth may be more effective when 
employees already buy into safety generally.   
Further, future research could identify at what level of safety climate/norms are specific 
safety initiatives more likely to be effective and enacted by employees. For instance, do safety 
norms at the group or organizational level, or at both levels, enhance the effectiveness of safety 
equipment use and incentives or rewards for engaging in safe behaviors. It is likely that some 
initiatives, perhaps more passive in nature, could be enacted in low safety norm settings, thereby 
enhancing perceptions of safety norms making more active initiatives possible. Further, 
additional research may evaluate the mechanisms by which group and organizational safety 
norms improve leadership and team interactions in more interactive types of safety initiatives, 
such as AARs.   
Finally, additional research may also link these relationships to objective safety outcomes 
specific to the industry of interest. Such outcomes may reflect adverse event occurrences—in the 
case of this study, an objective outcome would be the number or rate of falls. However, objective 
safety outcomes may also emphasize near misses or ‘good catches’ in which an action that had 
the potential to cause harm or damage was caught and avoided. 
  
SAFETY NORMS AND POST-FALL HUDDLES  22 
 
References 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2014). Interim update on 2013 annual hospital-
acquired condition rate and estimates of cost savings and deaths averted from 2010 to 
2013. Rockville, MD. Retrieved from 
http://www.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/publications/files/interimhacrate2013.pdf 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2016). Surveys on patient safety culture research 
reference list. Retrieved December 2, 2016, from 
http://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient-
safety/patientsafetyculture/resources/index.html#Psychometric_US 
Allen, J. A., Baran, B. E., & Scott, C. W. (2010). After-action reviews: A venue for the 
promotion of safety climate. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 42, 750–757. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2009.11.004 
Allen, J. A., Lehmann-Willenbrock, N., & Rogelberg, S. G. (2015). An Introduction to The 
Cambridge Handbook of Meeting Science: Why Now?. In J. A. Allen, N. Lehmann-
Willenbrock, and S. G. Rogelberg (Eds.) The Cambridge Handbook of Meeting 
Science. (pp. 3-11). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Alvesson, M. (2011). Leadership and organizational culture. In A. Bryman, D. L. Collinson, K. 
Grint, B. Jackson, & M. Uhl-Bien (Eds.), SAGE handbook of leadership (1st ed., pp. 151–
164). Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Andel, C., Davidow, S. L., Hollander, M., & Moreno, D. A. (2012). The economics of health 
care quality and medical errors. Journal of Health Care Finance, 39, 39–50. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23155743 
Becker, T. E. (2005). Potential problems in the statistical control of variables in organizational 
SAFETY NORMS AND POST-FALL HUDDLES  23 
 
research: A qualitative analysis with recommendations. Organizational Research Methods, 
8, 274–289. http://doi.org/10.1177/1094428105278021 
Borgersen, H. C., Hystad, S, W., Larsson, G., & Eid, J. (2014). Authentic leadership and safety 
climate among seafarers. Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies, 21, 394-402. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1548051813499612 
Boushon, B., Nielsen, G., Quigley, P., Rutherford, P., Taylor, J., Shannon, D., & Rita, S. (2012). 
Transforming care at the bedside how-to guide: Reducing patient injuries from falls. 
Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from 
http://www.ihi.org/resources/pages/tools/tcabhowtoguidereducingpatientinjuriesfromfalls.as
px 
Busby, J. S. (1999). The effectiveness of collective retrospection as a mechanism of 
organisational learning. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 35, 109–129. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0021886399351009 
Chassin, M. R., & Loeb, J. M. (2011). The ongoing quality improvement journey: Next stop, 
high reliability. Health Affairs, 30(4), 559–568. http://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2011.0076 
Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. R. (1998). Social influence: Social norms, conformity and 
compliance. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fisk, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social 
psychology (4th ed., pp. 151–192). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Clarke, S. (2006). The relationship between safety climate and safety performance: A meta-
analytic review. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 11, 315–327. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8998.11.4.315 
Cohen, M. A., Rogelberg, S. G., Allen, J. A., & Luong, A. (2011). Meeting design characteristics 
and attendee perceptions of staff/team meeting quality. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, 
SAFETY NORMS AND POST-FALL HUDDLES  24 
 
and Practice, 15, 90–104. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0021549 
Conway, J. M., & Lance, C. E. (2010). What reviewers should expect from authors regarding 
common method bias in organizational research. Journal of Business and Psychology, 25, 
325–334. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-010-9181-6 
Degelau, J., Belz, M., Flavin, P. L., Harper, C., Leys, K., Lundquist, L., & Webb, B. (2012). 
Prevention of falls (acute care). Retrieved from https://www.icsi.org/_asset/dcn15z/Falls-
Interactive0412.pdf 
Dunn, A. M., Scott, C. W., Allen, J. A., & Bonilla, D. (2016). Quantity and quality: Increasing 
safety norms through after action reviews. Human Relations, Advance online publication. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0018726715609972 
Ellis, S., Mendel, R., & Nir, M. (2006). Learning from successful and failed experience: The 
moderating role of kind of after-event review. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91, 669–680. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.91.3.669 
Flex Monitoring Team. (2004). Quality improvement activities in critical access hospitals: 
Results of the 2004 National CAH survey. Flex Monitoring Team Briefing Paper No. 2. 
Retrieved from http://www.flexmonitoring.org/wp-content/uploads/2004/09/bp2.pdf 
Hayes, A. F. (2009). Beyond Baron and Kenny: Statistical mediation analysis in the new 
millennium. Communication Monographs, 76, 408–420. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/03637750903310360 
Hobfoll, S. E. (1989). Conservation of resources: A new attempt at conceptualizing stress. 
American Psychologist, 44, 513–524. http://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.44.3.513 
Hofmann, D. A., & Stetzer, A. (1996). A cross-level investigation of factors influencing unsafe 
behaviors and accidents. Personnel Psychology, 49, 307–339. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-
SAFETY NORMS AND POST-FALL HUDDLES  25 
 
6570.1996.tb01802.x 
Hofmann, D. A., & Stetzer, A. (1998). The role of safety climate and communication in accident 
interpretation: Implications for learning from negative events. Academy of Management 
Journal, 41, 644–657. http://doi.org/10.2307/256962 
James, J. T. (2013). A new, evidence-based estimate of patient harms associated with hospital 
care. Journal of Patient Safety, 9, 122–128. http://doi.org/10.1097/PTS.0b013e3182948a69 
Jones, K. J., Venema, D. M., Nailon, R., Skinner, A. M., High, R., & Kennel, V. (2015). Shifting 
the paradigm: An assessment of the quality of fall risk reduction in Nebraska hospitals. 
Journal of Rural Health, 31, 135–145. http://doi.org/10.1111/jrh.12088 
Mahoney, J. E. (1998). Immobility and falls. Clinics in Geriatric Medicine, 14, 699–726. 
Malouff, J. M., Calic, A., McGrory, C. M., Murrell, R. L., & Schutte, N. S. (2012). Evidence for 
a needs-based model of organizational-meeting leadership. Current Psychology, 31, 35–48. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-012-9129-2 
National Safety Council. (2014). The journey to safety excellence. Retrieved from 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=86029418&site=ehost-
live 
Nicolini, D., Waring, J., & Megnis, J. (2011). Policy and practice in the use of root cause 
analysis to investigate clinical adverse events: Mind the gap. Social Science and Medicine, 
73, 217–225. http://doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.05.010 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method 
biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. 
The Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 879–903. http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-
9010.88.5.879 
SAFETY NORMS AND POST-FALL HUDDLES  26 
 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2012). Sources of method bias in social 
science research and recommendations on how to control it. Annual Review of Psychology, 
63, 539–569. http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100452 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Contemporary approaches to assessing mediation in 
communication research. In A. F. Hayes, M. D. Slater, & L. B. Snyder (Eds.), The SAGE 
sourcebook of advanced data analysis methods for communication research (pp. 13–54). 
Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Provost, S. M., Lanham, H. J., Leykum, L. K., Mc Daniel Jr., R. R., & Pugh, J. (2015). Health 
care huddles: Managing complexity to achieve high reliability. Health Care Management 
Review, 40, 2–12. http://doi.org/10.1097/HMR.000000000000009 
Ravn, I. (2013). A folk theory of meetings – and beyond. European Business Review, 25, 163–
173. http://doi.org/10.1108/09555341311302666 
Reiter-Palmon, R., Kennel, V., Allen, J. A., Jones, K. J., & Skinner, A. M. (2015). Naturalistic 
decision making in after-action review meetings: The implementation of and learning from 
post-fall huddles. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 88, 322–340. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/joop.12084 
Schein, E. H. (2010). Organizational culture and leadership (4th ed.). San Francisco, CA: 
Wiley. 
Scott, C., Allen, J. A., Bonilla, D. L., Baran, B. E., & Murphy, D. (2013). Ambiguity and 
freedom of dissent in post-incident discussion. Journal of Business Communication, 50, 
383–402. http://doi.org/10.1177/0021943613497054 
Seibold, D. R., & Krikorian, D. H. (1997). Planning and facilitating group meetings. In L. Frey 
& J. K. Barge (Eds.), Managing group life: Communicating in decision making groups (pp. 
SAFETY NORMS AND POST-FALL HUDDLES  27 
 
270–305). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.  
Shivers-Blackwell, S. (2006). The influence of perceptions of organizational structure & culture 
on leadership role requirements: The moderating impact of locus of control & self-
monitoring. Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies, 12, 27-49. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/107179190601200403 
Singer, S., Lin, S., Falwell, A., Gaba, D., & Baker, L. (2009). Relationship of safety climate and 
safety performance in hospitals. Health Services Research, 44, 399–421. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6773.2008.00918.x 
Tannenbaum, S. I., & Cerasoli, C. P. (2013). Do team and individual debriefs enhance 
performance? A meta-analysis. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society, 55, 231–245. http://doi.org/10.1177/0018720812448394 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2013). Critical access hospital rural health 
fact sheet series. Retrieved from http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-
Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/CritAccessHospfctsht.pdf 
Zohar, D. (2000). A group-level model of safety climate: Testing the effect of group climate on 
microaccidents in manufacturing jobs. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 587–596. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.85.4.587 
Zohar, D., & Luria, G. (2005). A multilevel model of safety climate: cross-level relationships 
between organization and group-level climates. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 616–
628. http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.90.4.616 
 
 
  
SAFETY NORMS AND POST-FALL HUDDLES  28 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Group safety norms 4.03 .69 (.80)           
2. Organizational safety norms 4.00 .68 .57** (.70)         
3. Huddle leader behavior 4.07 .60 .36** .36** (.96)       
4. Huddle effectiveness 3.78 .79 .41** .40** .60** (.94)     
5. Gender -- -- .08 .10 -.05 .04 --   
6. Age 42.91 12.58 .05 .13 .04 .01 .05 -- 
Note. N = 206. Cronbach alpha reliabilities reported on the diagonal in parentheses.   
**p < .01.                 
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Table 2 
          
Multiple regression analysis to test group safety norms mediation  
    
Model Variable b SE t β F R2 ΔF ΔR2 
1 Intercept 1.88 .35 5.30**   29.56** .17   
  Group safety norms .47 .09 5.44** .41         
2 Intercept -.22 .40 -.05   48.10** .40 55.59** .23 
  Group safety norms .26 .08 3.29** .23     
  Huddle leader behavior .68 .09 7.46** .51         
Note. N = 206.         
**p < .01.         
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Table 3 
        
Multiple regression analysis to test organizational safety norms mediation  
   
Model Variable b SE t β F R2 ΔF ΔR2 
1 Intercept 1.94 .36 5.42**   27.23** .14   
  Organizational safety norms .46 .09 5.22** .40         
2 Intercept .03 .40 .07   47.01** .38 56.48** .24 
  Organizational safety norms .24 .08 3.01** .21     
  Huddle leader behavior .68 .09 7.52** .52         
Note. N = 206. 
        
**p < .01. 
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Table 4 
         
Mediation of the effects of group safety norms and organizational safety norms on huddle 
effectiveness through huddle leader behaviors 
        Bootstrapping 
  
Product of 
Coefficients 
Percentile  
95% CI BC 95% CI BCa 95% CI 
  β SE Z Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
GSN - HLB - HE .24** .069 3.92 .112 .385 .122 .397 .120 .394 
OSN - HLB - HE .23** .107 3.94 .058 .450 .048 .429 .019 .391 
Note. N = 206. GSN = group safety norms; OSN = organizational safety norms; HLB = huddle 
leader behaviors; HE = huddle effectiveness; CI = confidence interval; BC = bias corrected; BCa = 
bias corrected and accelerated; 5,000 bootstrap samples. 
** p < .01. 
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Figure 1: Traditional Safety Intervention to Safety Climate Model 
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Figure 2: Mediated Model of Safety Norms on Huddle Effectiveness through Leader Behaviors 
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